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Abstract: To improve risk management in the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), the
European Climate Exchange (ECX) has introduced option instruments in October 2006 after regulatory autho-
rization. The central question we address is: can we identify a potential destabilizing effect of the introduction
of options on the underlying market (EU ETS futures)? Indeed, the literature on commodities futures suggest
that the introduction of derivatives may either decrease (due to more market depth) or increase (due to more
speculation) volatility. As the identification of these effects ultimately remains an empirical question, we use
daily data from April 2005 to April 2008 to document volatility behavior in the EU ETS. By instrumenting
various GARCH models, endogenous break tests, and rolling window estimations, our results overall suggest
that the introduction of the option market had no effect on the volatility in the EU ETS. These finding are
robust to other likely influences linked to energy and commodity markets.
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21 Introduction
To what extent does the introduction of option prices tend to destabilize tradable permits markets?
Indeed, allowing for option trading in a regulated market may have some consequences on volatility
in the underlying market. On the one hand, most of the empirical evidence for equities, bonds and
commodities suggests that options do not increase volatility, but rather increase the liquidity and the
informational efficiency of the underlying market. On the other hand, the introduction of options
may affect the volatility of the underlying market, since they affect producers’ decisions through
intertemporal arbitrage (Weaver and Banerjee (1990)). Options may also guide producers’ decisions
based on a mix of true information and speculators’ noise signals (Back (1993)).
Previous empirical literature provides mixed conclusions concerning the introduction of options. In
an exhaustive survey on this topic, Mayhew (2000) shows ambiguous effects of the introduction of
derivatives on the volatility of the underlying asset, i.e. it may be either positive or negative depending
on the market under consideration (equities, bonds, or commodities). Fleming and Ostdiek (1999)
have contributed to the analysis of the introduction of derivatives instruments on the underlying crude
oil market and derived products. Thus, detecting whether the introduction of options has increased or
decreased volatility in the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) remains an empirical
issue worth of investigation.
The EU ETS is a compliance market, which means that each installation of the approximately 10,600
covered installations needs to surrender each year a number of allowances, fixed by each Member
State in its National Allocation Plan (NAP), equal to its verified emissions (Ellerman and Buchner
(2008), Alberola et al. (2009)). To comply with their emissions target, installations may exchange
quotas either over-the-counter, or through brokers and market places.5 Bluenext6 is the market place
dedicated to CO2 allowances based in Paris. It has been created on June 24, 2005 and has become the
most liquid platform for spot trading.7 The European Climate Exchange (ECX) is the market place
based in London. It has been created on April 22, 2005 and is the most liquid platform for futures
and option trading.8
Following the rapid development of spot and futures trading on these exchanges9, more sophisticated
carbon products have been progressively introduced, thereby offering to market participants a greater
flexibility in the management of their compliance requirements. Option prices have been introduced
by ECX on October 13, 2006.10 The introduction of carbon option prices naturally raises the question
of their utility for market agents. There are mainly two uses of options: (i) for speculation purpose
in order to make a profit from trading, and (ii) for hedging purpose, in order to reduce or eliminate
5To guarantee compliance, any reported violation may be associated with a high penalty (Stranlund et al. (2005)).
The existence of a hedging (option) instrument may facilitate compliance, and as such be viewed as a complement of
enforcing policies.
6Formerly called Powernext Carbon.
772% of the volume of spot contracts are traded on Bluenext (Reuters).
896% of the volume of futures contracts are traded on ECX (Reuters).
9Other exchanges are worth mentioning: (i) NordPool, which represents the market place common to Denmark, Finland,
Sweden, Norway, and is based in Oslo; (ii) the European Energy Exchange (EEX), based in Leipzig, trading spot and
derivatives products for emissions allowances rights; and (iii) the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX), based in
the U.S., which is also trading European futures and options emissions rights. The price of products exchanged on these
market places are strongly correlated, which is also a feature of stock markets.
10Note option prices have also been introduced by EEX on March 5, 2008. However, we do not have enough historical
data at hand for this product and liquidity was known to be very low. So, we decide to focus on ECX option prices
only. The study of discrepancies between ECX and EEX option prices is left for further research.
3the risk in a position. The second use obviously allows industrials to lower the economic, political
and financial uncertainties attached to market developments in the EU ETS. Bo¨hringer et al. (2008)
emphasize that overlapping regulatory instruments should be avoided to achieve efficiency in global
environmental policy. The main “environmental policy”-related risk for industrials would then consist
in permits price changes, which could be strongly reduced by using hedging instruments such as
options.
Empirical studies of the EU ETS option market remain scarce. Uhrig-Homburg and Wagner (2007)
describe extensively derivative instruments in the EU carbon market based on qualitative surveys.
Chesney and Taschini (2008) provide an application of CO2 price dynamics modeling to option pricing.
Chevallier et al. (2009) provide a case-study of investors’ changes in risk aversion around the 2006
compliance event using both futures and option prices. To our best knowledge, no prior study has
investigated the impact of the options introduction in the EU ETS on the characteristics of the
underlying carbon price in terms of volatility.
When introducing option trading in October 2006, the ECX may have indirectly increased the volatility
of the underlying futures market. Indeed, the higher the leverage effect associated with option trading,
the higher speculation about fuel substitution develops, which translates into rising volatility. This
effect has been observed in some other markets and is generally viewed as a negative externality by
the regulator. More specifically, we examine the following central questions: what is the impact of
the option market on the carbon price in terms of volatility? Is the introduction of the option market
the only cause behind volatility changes? The latter question leads us to consider other factors such
as institutional decisions, energy and global commodity markets to which volatility changes could be
attributed as well.
Our empirical study departs from previous literature on several aspects. First, we develop a GARCH
model with a dummy variable to study the impact of the introduction of the option market (Antoniou
and Foster (1992), Antoniou and Holmes (1995), Gulen and Mayhew (2000)). Then, we proceed with
an endogenous structural break test (Incla´n and Tiao (1994), Sanso´, Arago´ and Carrion (2004)) to
detect more precisely the influence of options introduction. To the best of our knowledge, this kind
of test has not been used for such a purpose yet. After taking into account the volatilities of several
energy- and commodity-related variables, we do not observe any impact of the introduction of the
option market on the volatility of the carbon futures prices. These results therefore suggest that the
observed changes in the unconditional component of volatility for EU ETS futures returns and the
introduction of options are not linked .
This econometric analysis is finally taken one step further by using rolling estimations with a window of
200 observations. Results reveal the influence of the 2005 and 2006 compliance events on the volatility
of CO2 returns, but also clearly feature a long-lasting influence of options introduction (during several
months). We are thus able to identify in a dynamic framework the impact of the introduction of
the option market on volatility in the EU ETS (and not only as a “one-off” event as in previous
literature). Overall, our article brings a better understanding of the role played by the option market
on the volatility of the carbon price in the EU ETS.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the carbon futures and option
markets. Section 3 summarizes the data used. Section 4 details the econometric methodology, along
4with estimation results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Overview of the futures and option markets in the EU ETS
In what follows, we detail key design issues, the volume of transactions, as well as the introduction of
futures and option prices in the EU ETS.
2.1 Key design issues
The EU ETS has been created by the Directive 2003/87/CE. Across its 27 Member States, it covers
large plants from CO2-intensive emitting industrial sectors with a rated thermal input exceeding 20
MWh. One allowance exchanged on the EU ETS corresponds to one ton of CO2 released in the
atmosphere, and is called a European Union Allowance (EUA). 2.2 billion allowances per year have
been distributed during Phase I (2005-2007). 2.08 billion allowances per year will be distributed during
Phase II (2008-2012). With a value of around =C20 per allowance, the launch of the EU ETS thus
corresponds to a net creation of wealth of around =C40 billion per year. On January 2008, the European
Commission has extended the scope of the EU trading system to other sectors such as aviation and
petro-chemicals by 2013, and confirmed its functioning Phase III until 2020.
2.2 Transactions
During Phase I (2005-2007), the total volume of allowances exchanged in the EU ETS has been steadily
increasing. The number of transactions has been multiplied by a factor four between 2005 and 2006,
going from 262 to 809 million tons. This increasing liquidity of the market has been confirmed in 2007,
where the volume of transactions recorded equals 1.5 billion tons. This peak of transactions may be
explained by the growth of the number of contracts valid during Phase II, with delivery dates going
from December 2008 to December 2012, which amount for 4% of total exchanges in 2005, and 85% in
2007. These transactions reached =C5.97 billion in 2005, =C15.2 billion in 2006, and =C24.1 billion in
2007, thereby confirming the fact that the EU ETS represents the largest emissions trading scheme to
date in terms of transactions.
In 2008, the carbon market was worth between =C89-94 billion, up more than 80% year-on-year
(Reuters). The launch of secondary certified emission reduction (CER)11 contracts on ECX certainly
fostered this growth rate of transactions.
2.3 Futures market
We choose to model the behavior of the ECX futures prices for the carbon time-series in this article.
One reason is that, due to the banking restrictions implemented between 2007 and 2008 (Alberola
11According to the article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, Credit Development Mechanisms (CDM) projects consist in achieving
GHG emissions reduction in non-Annex B countries. After validation, the UNFCCC delivers credits called Certified
Emissions Reductions (CERs) that may be used by Annex B countries for use towards their compliance position. CERs
are fungible with EU ETS allowances with a maximum limit of around 13.4% on average.
5and Chevallier, 2009), spot prices show a non-reliable behavior during Phase I 12. We detail below the
main characteristics of ECX futures.
2.3.1 Contract specifications
The futures contract is a deliverable contract where each member with a position open at cessation
of trading for a contract month is obliged to make or take delivery of emission allowances to or from
national registries. The unit of trading is one lot of 1,000 emission allowances. Each emission allowance
represents an entitlement to emit one ton of carbon dioxide equivalent gas. Market participants may
purchase consecutive contract months to March 2008, and then December contract months from
December 2008 to December 2012.13 Delivery occurs by mid-month of the expiration contract date.
Trading occurs from 07.00AM to 05.00PM GMT.
2.3.2 Volume analysis
The trading of ECX futures started on April 22, 2005 with varying delivery dates going from December
2005 to December 2012. Futures contracts with vintages December 2013 and 2014 were introduced
on April 8, 2008. For the December 2009 futures contract, futures trade at =C13.32/ton of CO2 as of
January 15, 2009, and have reached a maximum price of =C32.90/ton of CO2 in 2008.14 From April
2005 to January 2009, the total volume of ECX futures exchanged for all vintages is equal to 40.67
billion.
2.4 Option market
We describe below the main characteristics of ECX option prices.
2.4.1 Contract specifications
ECX option trading started on October 13, 2006. The underlying security for option trading is the
ECX futures contract of corresponding maturity. Options have been introduced on ECX as European-
style options, i.e. option prices convey the right, but not the obligation to buy (call) or sell (put) the
underlying asset at a specified strike price and expiration date.15 Similarly, the contract size is 1,000
emissions allowances. On January 15, 2009 for the underlying futures price of 13.28=C/ton of CO2,
calls and puts finance rates were equal to, respectively, =C2.64 and =C2.31 with 328 days remaining
to the option expiration. The strike prices available range from 6 to 20=C/ton of CO2 with unitary
increases. Expiration dates for ECX option prices are summarized in table 1.
12Besides, in the EU ETS, allowances need to be surrendered only on a yearly basis during the compliance event by
mid-May, which makes the distinction between spot and forward prices less relevant than on other commodity markets
such as the crude oil or the electricity market where storage costs are important. Note by contrast that storage costs
are zero for CO2 allowances.
13Note spreads between two futures contracts may also be traded.
14In the longer term, analysts forecast EUA prices of =C20-25/ton of CO2 over Phase II and =C25-30/ton of CO2 over
Phase III (Reuters).
15An American option is like an European option, except it can be exercised at any time prior to maturity.
6Table 1
Expiration dates for ECX option prices
Source: Bloomberg
Month Last Trade Expiration
November 2006 11/22/06 11/22/06
December 2006 12/19/06 12/19/06
December 2007 12/24/07 12/24/07
December 2008 12/10/08 12/10/08
January 2009 1/21/09 1/21/09
February 2009 2/18/09 2/18/09
December 2009 12/9/09 12/9/09
December 2010 12/15/10 12/15/10
December 2011 12/14/11 12/14/11
December 2012 12/14/12 12/14/12
2.4.2 Volume analysis
The volume of option prices traded from October 13, 2006 to January 16 2009 for the futures contracts
of maturity December 2007 to December 2012 are presented in Table 7, along with the average volume
contract for each strike.
The total volume of option prices traded is equal to 235Mton of CO2 for the December 2008 contract,
and to 73 Mton of CO2 for the December 2009 contract. Calls are more actively traded than puts
with an average volume of, respectively, 163 Mton and 72 Mton of CO2 for the December 2008
contract. This pattern is reversed for the December 2009 contract with a total volume of calls and
puts traded equal to, respectively, 31 Mton and 42 Mton of CO2. This latter result may be explained
by anticipations of carbon price decreases due to economic uncertainties by market participants. We
may notice that the volume of call prices exchanged is clustered around the strikes ranging between
=C25 and =C28. Conversely, the volume of put prices exchanged is clustered around the strikes ranging
from =C15 to =C24. These asymmetries reflect the hedging strategies constructed by market agents
to reduce the risk of their position with regard to high/low carbon price changes. They also reflect
the uncertainties affecting the allowance market concerning the possible range of price changes in a
moving institutional context.
3 Data
Our sample period goes from April 22, 2005 to April 04, 2008. We gather a full sample of 756 daily
observations, with 378 daily observations in each sub-sample before and after the introduction of
option prices on October 13, 2006. The source of the data is ECX, Bloomberg and Reuters.
3.1 Carbon Price
For carbon allowances, we use daily futures and option prices for the December 2008-2009 contracts
traded in =C/ton of CO2 on ECX. Figure 1 shows the futures price development for contracts of
maturities December 2008 and 2009 from April 22, 2005 to January 16, 2009. We may observe that
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Figure 1
Carbon futures prices of maturities December 2008 (left) and 2009 (right) from April 22, 2005
to January 16, 2009
Source: European Climate Exchange
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Figure 2
Returns on ECX Carbon Futures Prices of maturities December 2008 (left) and 2009 (right)
from April 22, 2005 to January 16, 2009
futures prices for delivery during Phase II (2008-2012) proved to be much more reliable than futures
prices for delivery during Phase I (2005-2007) due to the banking restrictions enforced between the
two Phases (Alberola and Chevallier, 2009). Besides, we note that post-2007 futures convey a coherent
price signal - around 20 =C/ton of CO2 - throughout the historical available data for the second phase
of the scheme. The futures price development features a lower bound around 15=C/ton of CO2 in April
2007, and an upper bound around 35=C/ton of CO2 in November 2008.
Descriptive statistics of ECX futures contracts of maturity December 2008 and 2009 are presented in
Table 2. We may observe that ECX futures of all maturities present negative skewness and excess
kurtosis16. These summary statistics therefore reveal an asymmetric and leptokurtic distribution.17
3.2 Energy Prices
According to previous literature, energy prices are the most important drivers of carbon prices due to
the ability of power generators to switch between their fuel inputs (Delarue et al. (2008), Ellerman
16Note for a normally distributed random variable skewness is zero, and kurtosis is three.
17Such a fat-tailed distribution may suggest a GARCH modeling as GARCH models better accommodate excess kurtosis
in the data.
8Table 2
Descriptive Statistics of ECX EUA Futures Returns and Energy and Global Commodity Markets
Returns from April 22, 2005 to January 16, 2009
Source: European Climate Exchange, Reuters
Full Period Mean Median Max Min Std.
Dev.
Skew. Kurt. N
Carbon Futures Returns
EUADEC08 -0.0018 0.0200 3.6500 -7.4000 0.6149 -2.2450 29.7930 936
EUADEC09 -0.0047 0.0200 3.9000 -7.4000 0.6169 -2.1299 29.1426 957
Energy and Global Commodity Markets Returns
Brent -0.0135 0.0381 11.0876 -15.6324 1.6227 -0.8159 19.0411 830
Coal 0.0034 0.0100 8.2900 -5.5600 0.6566 1.1207 46.3338 830
CRB 0.0619 0.4000 30.5700 -38.8100 5.3023 -0.8334 12.9586 830
CleanDark 0.0151 -0.0250 50.1700 -40.1400 4.2297 1.4064 50.5866 830
Ngas 0.0009 -0.0700 42.4500 -20.5200 3.2438 3.3141 49.2934 830
Power 0.0121 -0.0200 43.7100 -39.7800 4.1482 0.5050 44.8046 830
CleanSpark 0.0137 -0.0300 45.5000 -42.2200 4.8714 0.0109 33.3175 830
Switch 0.0001 0.0001 0.0500 -0.0300 0.0053 1.3380 18.8594 830
Note: EUADEC08 to EUADEC14 refer to the carbon futures returns of maturity December 2008 to
December 2014, CRB to the Reuters/Commodity Research Bureau Futures Index, StdDev. refers to
the standard deviation, Skew. refers to the skewness, Kurt. refers to the kurtosis, and N refers to
the number of observations.
and Feilhauer (2008)). This option to switch from natural gas to coal in their inputs represents an
abatement opportunity to reduce CO2 emissions in the short term. High (low) energy prices contribute
to an increase (decrease) of carbon prices. This logic is described by Kanen (2006) who identifies brent
prices as the main driver of natural gas prices which, in turn, affect power prices and ultimately carbon
prices. Bunn and Fezzi (2007) also identify econometrically that carbon prices react significantly to a
shock on gas prices in the short term. Descriptive statistics for energy and global commodity markets
returns may also be found in Table 2.
3.2.1 Brent, Natural Gas, and Coal Prices
For energy prices, we use the daily Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) Crude Oil Brent Free-of-Board
in $/barrel, the daily ICE Natural Gas 1-Month Forward contract traded in UK pence/Therm, and
the daily coal futures Month Ahead price CIF ARA18 traded in =C/ton. Price series are converted to
=C using the daily exchange rate provided by the European Central Bank.
Figure 3 presents the price development for the Zeebrugge natural gas next month, Rotterdam coal
futures, and NYMEX crude oil futures price series from April 22, 2005 to January 16, 2009. Natural
gas prices exhibit a strong volatility compared to coal prices. In November 2005 and September
2008, natural gas prices soared to 90=C/MWh, and steadily decreased afterwards to 40=C/MWh in
February 2008 and December 2008. The competitiveness of natural gas compared to coal may be
more specifically captured during the period going from December 2006 to July 2007. The brent price
series peaked over 80=C/barrel from May to August 2008.
18CIF ARA defines the price of coal inclusive of freight and insurance delivered to the large North West European ports,
e.g. Amsterdam, Rotterdam or Antwerp.
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Figure 3
Zeebrugge natural gas, Rotterdam coal futures, and NYMEX crude oil futures prices from April
22, 2005 to January 16, 2009
Source: Reuters
3.2.2 Power, Clean Spark, Clean Dark, and Switch Prices
The price of electricity Powernext (elec in =C/MWh) is the contract of futures Month Ahead Base. To
take account of abatement options for energy industrials and relative fuel prices, three specific spreads
are included.
First, the Clean Dark Spread (clean dark spread expressed in =C/MWh) represents the difference
between the price of electricity at peak hours and the price of coal used to generate that electricity,
corrected for the energy output of the coal plant and the costs of CO2:
clean dark spread = elec− (coal ∗ 1
ρcoal
+ pt ∗ EFcoal) (1)
with ρcoal the net thermal efficiency of a conventional coal-fired plant.19, and EFcoal the CO2 emissions
factor of a conventional coal-fired power plant20
Second, the Clean Spark Spread (clean spark spread expressed in =C/MWh) represents the difference
between the price of electricity at peak hours and the price of natural gas used to generate that
electricity, corrected for the energy output of the gas-fired plant and the costs of CO2:
19i.e. 35% according to Reuters.
20i.e. 0.95 tCO2/MWh according to Reuters.
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Figure 4
Powernext electricity futures, Clean Spark Spread, Clean Dark Spread, and Switch prices
from April 22, 2005 to January 16, 2009
Source: Reuters
clean spark spread = elec− (ngas ∗ 1
ρngas
+ pt ∗ EFngas) (2)
with ρngas the net thermal efficiency of a conventional gas-fired plant.21, and EFngas the CO2 emissions
factor of a conventional gas-fired power plant22
Third, the switch price of CO2, expressed in =C/MWh, is used as a proxy of the abatement cost:
switch =
costngas/MWh− costcoal/MWh
tCO2coal/MWh− tCO2ngas/MWh (3)
with costngas the production cost of one MWh of electricity on base of net CO2 emissions of gas in
=C/MWh, costcoal the production cost of one MWh of electricity on base of net CO2 emissions of
coal in =C/MWh, tCO2coal the emissions factor in CO2/MWh of a conventional coal-fired plant, and
tCO2ngas the emissions factor in CO2/MWh of a conventional gas-fired plant as detailed above.
The Switch price represents the fictional daily price of CO2 that establishes the equilibrium between
the Clean Dark and Clean Spark spreads. It is advantageous in the short term to switch from coal to
natural gas, when the daily CO2 price is above the Switch price, and conversely.
As shown in Figure 4, the use of coal appeared more profitable than natural gas during 2005-2006.
Since the beginning of 2007, the difference between both spreads has been narrowing. This situation
21i.e. 49.13% according to Reuters.
22i.e. 0.41 tCO2/MWh according to Reuters.
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therefore provides incentives for power operators to switch the use of natural gas instead of coal, as
represented by the Switch price series. Besides, we may note a peak in the price of electricity from
September to November 2008.
3.3 Global commodity markets
Several indices may be used to capture the influence of risk factors linked to global commodity markets.
The main index which is used as the barometer of commodity prices is the Reuters/Commodity
Research Bureau (CRB) Futures Index. This index is composed of 17 commodities in different sectors
such as energy, grains, industrials, livestock, precious metals and softs. It may be viewed as a broad
measure of overall commodity products.23
The constituent commodities and the economic weighting of these indices aim at minimizing the
idiosyncratic effects of some individual commodity markets.24 As a commodity, the dynamics of
futures allowance prices are very likely to be impacted by the price volatility on global commodity
markets, and thus we include the Reuters/CRB Futures Index as an exogenous factor in our estimates.
Energy and global commodity markets returns are presented in Figure 5.
3.4 Correlation between energy and global commodity markets
We are able to alleviate correlation concerns among energy and global commodity markets by looking
at the correlation matrix between the returns of potential explanatory variables in Table 3.
The correlation levels remain low, i.e. strictly inferior to 60%. We thus may use the returns on
energy and global commodity markets as potential factors affecting changes in volatility without any
problematic collinearities. Since it is possible to have low correlations together with collinearity, we
have investigated the presence of multicolinearity by computing the inflation of variance between
explanatory variables. These calculations did not reveal serious problematic multicolinearities.25
In the next section, we present the econometric methodology used along with our estimation results.
4 Empirical analysis
Our econometric methodology may be broadly summarized in four different steps: (i) we estimate
a GARCH model with a dummy variable to compare the level of (unconditional) volatility of the
underlying allowance market before and after the introduction of the option market; (ii) we include
other factors in the variance equation of the GARCH model to control for exogenous effects from
relevant variables; (iii) we discuss volatility dynamics issues during sub-periods; and (iv) we finally
23Other indices coming from brokers in the banking industry may also be used for sensitivity tests purposes. The
Dow Jones-American International Group Commodity Index (DJ-AIGCI) is a benchmark for commodity investments
composed of 20 commodities within the energy, petroleum, precious metals, industrial metals, grains, livestock and softs
sectors. The Standard & Poor’s Commodity Index (SPCI) is a cross section of 17 agricultural and industrial commodities
traded in the energy, fibers, grains, meat and livestocks, metals and softs sectors. The Deutsche Bank Commodity Index
(DBCI) is composed of six commodities in the crude oil, heating oil, aluminium, gold, wheat and corn industries, and
is designed to track the performance of investments in a small set of commodities in a variety of currencies.
24See Geman (2005) for a more detailed analysis of the construction, the coverage, the liquidity, and the weighting of each
index.
25To conserve space, those results are not presented here, and may be obtained upon request to the authors.
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Returns on Energy and Global Commodity Markets Variables from April 22, 2005 to January
16, 2009
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run rolling estimations to further identify the effects of the introduction of the option market on the
volatility dynamics of the EU ETS.
4.1 GARCH model
The GARCH modeling approach adopted here is common for financial time-series, and has been
applied to carbon prices in previous literature (Paolella and Taschini (2008), Benz and Truck (2009)).
GARCHmodels allow to take into account volatility clustering, indicated by fat-tails in the distribution
of financial time-series.
The impact of options trading is tested by amending the conditional variance equation of the GARCH
model with a dummy variable which takes values 0 for the pre-option period, and 1 for the post-option
period. This methodology has been applied by Antoniou and Holmes (1995), Gulen and Mayhew
(2000) for financial markets, and Antoniou and Foster (1992) for the crude oil market.26 Then, we
adopt the structure of a GARCH(1,1) model:
Rt = β0 + β1Rt−1 + ²t (4)
²t ∼
√
htet with et ∼ iid(0, 1)
ht = E(²2t | φt−1) = α0 + α1²2t−1 + α2ht−1 + γDFt (5)
with Rt the daily return on carbon futures prices, φt−1 is the set of past information, and ²t the error
term in Eq. (4). In the conditional variance Eq. (5), DFt is a dummy variable taking the value of 0
before the introduction of the option market, and 1 thereafter. This dummy variable allows to test for
the influence of the introduction of option prices on the volatility of the underlying carbon market.
4.1.1 Estimation
We first test Eq. (4) and (5) with a GARCH(1,1) model without the dummy accounting for the
introduction of the options market in the variance equation. A preliminary analysis of the returns
autocorrelation shows that modeling the conditional mean as an AR(1) eliminate the autocorrelation
for each contract. Those results, presented in Table 4 (rows (1) and (3)), reveal a strongly persistent
process, as the sum of α1 and α2 is close to 1. This characteristic is a classic feature of financial
time-series, and applies for both carbon futures contract of maturity December 2008 and 2009. The
time profile of the estimated conditional standard errors from this GARCH model are respectively
displayed in Figure 6 for the December 2008 and 2009 contracts. These graphs are very similar for
both contracts. During our study period, we observe that the carbon market has been more volatile
during the first 300 days, and that the level of volatility is quite lower after April 2006.
4.1.2 Modeling the option market introduction
We estimate Eq. (4) and (5) by introducing the dummy variable DFt capturing the changes in
volatility due to the introduction of the option market. Recall that DFt takes the value of 0 before
26Fleming and Ostdiek (1999) also consider the issue of the impact of derivatives trading on the spot crude oil market,
but using GMM methods as in Bollen (1998).
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From left to right: conditional standard deviation for the December 08 and 09 returns from a
GARCH (1,1)
Table 4
GARCH(1,1) model estimates with and without dummy variable for the carbon futures returns
of maturity December 2008 and December 2009
EUADEC08 EUADEC09
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean equation
β0 0.0023**
(0.001)
0.0021**
(0.001)
0.0020
(0.001)
0.0019
(0.001)
β1 0.1398***
(0.048)
0.1413***
(0.047)
0.1348***
(0.048)
0.1342***
(0.048)
Variance equation
α0 7.74e-05***
(1.45e-05)
8.33e-05***
(1.61e-05)
5.41e-05***
(1.24e-05)
6.18e-05 ***
(1.44e-05)
α1 0.3039***
(0.027)
0.2858***
(0.029)
0.2638***
(0.025)
0.2541***
(0.026)
α2 0.6544***
(0.037)
0.6710***
(0.039)
0.7120***
(0.034)
0.7193***
(0.035)
DF -1.85E-05
(1.26E-05)
-1.62E-05
(1.05E-05)
LL 1680.86 1681.38 1694.26 1694.92
Notes: The dependent variables are the EUA carbon futures return for the contract of maturity December 2008 and December
2009, depending on the column under consideration. Other variables are explained in eq(4) and (5). Standard errors in
parenthesis. *** indicates significance at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. LL refers to the log-likelihood.
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the introduction of the options market on October 13, 2006, and 1 thereafter.
Estimation results are presented in Table 4 (rows (2) and (4)).27 In Table 4, rows (2) and (4), we
may observe that DFt is not significant at any statistical level. The estimated conditional variances
do not differ from the GARCH model without dummy, and thus are not reproduced. While options
enable a more complete and liquid market, and a greater flexibility for market participants to hedge
their position on the carbon market, they do not seem to have a significant impact on the level of
volatility in the futures market. The latter result does not imply however necessarily that the dynamic
component of volatility has not been impacted, as will be discussed below. Indeed, it is worth noting
that the estimation results obtained in Table 4 concerning the introduction of the option market may
be driven by exogenous factors affecting the volatility of carbon futures returns. In other words, a
change in the level of the volatility may be hidden by the presence of other risk factors. To deal with
this issue, we now introduce exogenous factors in the variance equation of the GARCH model.
4.2 Exogenous variables in the conditional variance equation
One problem in Section 4.1 is that the date of the dummy variable is chosen a priori. Of course,
this choice is intuitive since we are interested in modeling how the introduction of the option market
affects volatility in the EU ETS. However, the impact of the introduction of the option market may
have arisen at a date different from its official opening. Furthermore, other structural breaks may have
affected the carbon market and the dynamics of conditional volatility. Detecting these breaks appears
crucial to obtain a correct modeling of the conditional standard error. To do so, we implement below
a test for structural breaks in the unconditional variance at unknown location.
4.2.1 Structural breaks in the unconditional variance
Incla´n and Tiao (1994) and Sanso´, Arago´ and Carrion (2004) have proposed a test for detecting a
break in the unconditional variance at unknown date.28
Our sample of returns {Rt}Tt=1 contains T observations. The test statistic is AIT = supk|T−0.5Gk|
where Gk = λˆ−0.5[Ck − (k/T )CT ], Ck =
∑k
t=1R
2
t , λˆ = γˆ0 + 2
∑m
l=1[1 − l(m + 1)−1]γˆl, γˆl =
T−1
∑T
t=l+1(R
2
t − σˆ2)((R2t−l − σˆ2), σˆ2 = T−1CT . γˆ represents a nonparametric adjustment factor
used to correct for non dependent processes. It is based on a Bartlett kernel with the lag truncation
parameter m.29 The value of k that maximises |T−0.5Gk| is the estimate of the break date. Critical
values are given in Sanso´, Arago´ and Carrion (2004).
Incla´n and Tiao (1994) developed the Iterated Cumulative Sum of Squares (ICSS) algorithm for
detecting multiple breaks in variance.30 We apply this algorithm to our AIT statistics to find possible
break dates in the unconditional variance of returns.
The AIT test statistic and the ICSS algorithm leads us to detect five breaks in the unconditional
27Note that we tested for various GARCH specifications, such as the GARCH-M developed in Antoniou and Foster (1992),
which is convenient for the modeling of a time-varying risk premium. None of them provided superior results. Similarly,
various innovation distributions have been implemented (Student t, asymmetric Student t, GED) to better accommodate
residual kurtosis, without further improving the results presented here.
28Tests for breaks in the unconditional variance have been recently extended by Andreou and Ghysels (2002). See also
Rapach and Strauss (2008).
29The lag truncation parameter is chosen as m = E[A(T/100)1/4] where T is the number of observations.
30A complete description of this algorithm can be found in their paper.
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Unconditional variances with break
Note: the blue line represents the squared returns and the red line represents the time profile of the
sample variance for the different periods detected from the breaks.
volatility. Figure 7 shows these breaks with their date. This graph also displays the time profile of
the sample unconditional variance for the six periods defined by these breaks and the squared returns,
considered as a proxy for the shocks hitting the market.
One obvious break in unconditional volatility occurs during the third (and shortest) period from
t=24/04/06 to t=15/05/06. During this time period, the market is highly volatile, as reflected by
the high values of the squared returns. The sample variance reaches its highest value for this time
period. This increase in unconditional variance can be connected with the first compliance break in
the time-series of CO2 returns due to the verification of 2005 emissions in April 2006 (Alberola et al.
(2008)).
We identify two periods where the unconditional volatility increases: the first one going from the
beginning of the sample to t1 =27/7/06, and the second one from t4 =20/11/06 to t5=16/07/07.
We observe however that during these periods the sample variance does not increase significantly, and
thus we do not further comment these breaks. In addition, no increase in volatility is detected using
the algorithm around the time options begin to be traded.
In what follows, to control for the sharp increase in volatility due to the 2006 compliance event, we
include the dummy variable DAPR06 which takes the value of 1 during the period going from April 25
to June 23, 2006, and 0 otherwise. This variable reflects the institutional development of the EU ETS
that occurred in April 2006 during Phase I (Alberola et al., 2008).
4.2.2 Introducing exogenous variables
As highlighted in previous literature (Christiansen et al. (2005), Mansanet-Bataller et al. (2007),
Alberola et al. (2008), Chevallier (2009)), the main risk-driving factors on the carbon market are
linked to institutional decisions and energy prices. Another source of risk may be linked to the
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variation of global commodity markets, which may be captured by various indices.
To take into account the impact of these factors on the volatility of carbon futures (besides considering
the impact of the option market), we include the volatility of several energy- and commodity-related
factors. We compute the standard deviations by using a moving window of 25 days (about one trading
month) for all factors described in the data section. This methodology is in line with Hadsell and
Shawky (2006) and Oberndorfer (2008), and has more formal support than “de-meaning” the mean
equation (as in Bologna and Cavallo (2002) for instance).
For energy variables, we use the volatility of returns on Brent, coal and natural gas prices, as well as
the volatility of clean dark and clean spark spreads and the switch price, to proxy for the influence of
power producers’ fuel-switching behavior on carbon price changes. The relationship between carbon
price changes and power producers’ fuel-switching behavior appears especially important to bear in
mind. Fuel-switching constitutes an important determinant of the CO2 price, given the proportion of
allowances distributed to the power sector, and the arbitrages being made by producers concerning
their energy-mix including the CO2 costs (Delarue et al. (2008), Ellerman and Feilhauer (2008)). For
global commodity markets, we include the Reuters/Commodity Research Bureau (CRB) index.
We test below for the potential impact of vol brent, vol gas, vol coal, vol power, vol clean spark, vol
clean dark, vol switch, and vol CRB on ECX futures returns volatility modelled using a GARCH
framework, by including the estimated volatility of returns of these potential explanatory variables
into the variance equation.
4.2.3 Results
Equation (5) is modified as follows:
ht = α0 + α1²2t−1 + α2ht−1 + γDFt + ϕXt (6)
with Xt a vector of exogenous variables including the dummy variable DAPR06 for the April 2006
structural break, estimated standard deviations for energy and the CRB variables.
As shown in Table 5, estimates from our extended model feature the statistical significance of several
factors for the December 2009 (rows (5) to (8)) contract and for the December 2008 contract (rows (1)
to (4)). Some of these significant variables are not the same for both contracts and their significance
is more robust for the December 2009 contract.
Concerning energy variables, vol coal and vol clean spark are significant for the December 2008 contract
while vol oil, vol clean spark and vol clean dark significantly impact the volatility of the December
2009 futures contract. The rationale behind the negative role of coal on CO2 price volatility is that,
when confronted to a rise of the price of coal relative to other energy markets, firms have an incentive
to adapt their energy mix towards less CO2 intensive sources, which yields to less needs of EUAs.
This result is conform to previous literature (Mansanet-Bataller et al. (2007), Alberola et al. (2008)).
The negative sign of vol spark for both contracts may be explained by the rather decreasing price
pattern of natural gas by contrast to coal during our sample period. vol oil positively impacts the
volatility returns of CO2 prices for the December 2009 contract. This positive impact can result from
the fact that oil is an input of installations covered by the ETS and that changes in its price also affect
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Figure 8
From left to right: conditional standard deviation for the December 08 and 09 returns from a
GARCH (1,1) with a dummy for the option market
economic activity. Therefore, an increase in oil price volatility induces uncertainty about economic
perspectives which can increase volatility on the CO2 market. Note that neither the DAPR06 dummy
for institutional developments, nor the CRB proxy for global commodity markets are statistically
significant.
To conclude, we have shown that even after controlling for other relevant energy, institutional and
risk factors, the DFt dummy variable accounting for the introduction of the option market remains
insignificant. This result is robust to the introduction of factors known to have an influence, such as
institutional decisions, energy and global commodity markets (Christiansen et al. (2005), Mansanet-
Bataller et al. (2007), Alberola et al. (2008)). Compared to Table 4, DFt is only significant at the 5%
for the December 2008. This finding is however not robust enough to be an evidence of the impact
of the option market opening. We therefore conclude that options introduction had no noticeable
impact on the unconditional volatility of CO2 returns. The conditional variances for both contracts
are displayed in Figure 8 and do not show any decrease in variance in the post “option introduction”
period.
4.3 Sub-period decomposition
Besides, we estimate GARCH models during two sub-periods to study the changes in volatility dynam-
ics of carbon futures returns before and after the introduction of option prices. According to Antoniou
and Foster (1992), this procedure allows to investigate empirically the effects of the introduction of the
option market by using both pre- and post-options volatility measures. Here, we do not precisely deal
with the impact of the introduction of the option market on the unconditional variance, but rather
on its dynamics in the spirit of Antoniou and Foster (1992), who studied the volatility of futures and
spot prices for brent crude oil products.
The econometric methodology consists in comparing the GARCH coefficients before (Sample #1)
and after (Sample #2) the introduction of the option market, by running separate estimates during
sub-periods. Estimation results are presented in Table 6 (rows (1) to (4)).
For Sample #1 (Table 6, rows (1) and (3)), we observe a strongly persistent (near integrated) effect
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Table 6
GARCH(1,1) model estimates before and after the introduction of the option market for the
December 2008 and 2009 carbon futures returns
EUADEC08 EUADEC09
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean equation
β0 0.0032**
(0.001)
0.0013
(0.001)
0.0036**
(0.001)
0.0014
(0.001)
β1 0.1777**
(0.080)
0.0660
(0.055)
0.1825**
(0.079)
0.0575
(0.0573)
Variance equation
α0 0.0001***
(2.07e-05)
3.81e-05**
(1.70e-05)
8.19e-05***
(2.03e-05)
3.57e-05**
(1.46e-05)
α1 0.6012***
(0.050)
0.1188***
(0.0325)
0.4611***
(0.044)
0.1281***
(0.0328)
α2 0.4737***
(0.039)
0.8203***
(0.050)
0.5870***
(0.043)
0.8163***
(0.046)
LL 811.33 882.27 811.21 894.38
Note: The dependent variables are the EUA carbon futures returns for the contracts of maturity December 2008 and
December 2009, depending on the column under consideration. Other variables are explained in Eq. (4) and (6). Standard
errors in parenthesis. *** indicates significance at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. LL refers to the log-likelihood.
of the variance of the process. For Sample # 2 (Table 6, rows (2) and (4)), we observe a reduced
persistence of shocks from the pre-options to the post-options period. The value of α1+α2 is close to
0.90 in Sample #2, which suggests that the variance process is not integrated (Engle and Bollerslev,
1986).
The second interesting result consists in a decrease in the autoregressive effect of the carbon futures
returns, as the coefficients for β1 go from 0.18 (row (1)) to 0.07 (row (2)) for the December 2008
contract.31 The level of the ARCH coefficient, which represents the reaction to new information, is
quite low, suggesting that the informational efficiency of the carbon market has decreased, since the
variance adjustment following the arrival of new information is slower. We may observe the same
pattern with the December 2009 contract, where the coefficients for β1 go from 0.18 (row (3)) to 0.06
(row (4)).
We did not find evidence of the influence of energy variables on the volatility of CO2 returns during
sub-periods. Overall, these results suggest that the dynamics of the variance are quite different before
and after the introduction of the options market, which may be inferred from GARCH standard
deviations plots in Figure 6.
4.4 Checking the time dependency of the model
In this section, we use a rolling estimation procedure to detect some change in the dynamics of the
conditional volatility. We estimate the same GARCH (1,1) model as in section 4.1.1. for a rolling
window of L=200 observations. We obtain a sequence of time indexed estimates of the autoregressive
coefficient {β1|t−L+1,t} and the coefficients of the GARCH model: {α0|t−L+1,t}, {α1,t−L+1,t} and
31We provide some additional informations on this decrease using rolling estimation in the next section.
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{α2,t−L+1,t} where the t-L,t denotes the sample used for each estimation. Our first estimation is
obtained for the sample ending in t=200=03/02/2006.
Figure 9 shows the rolling estimate of the autoregressive coefficient in the conditional mean regression.
Figures 10 and 11 show the estimates for the ARCH and GARCH coefficients, respectively. The
estimates of the GARCH model clearly show some instability in the estimated coefficients. Changing
patterns in the GARCH coefficients therefore indicate changes in the dynamics of conditional volatility.
A first sudden break appears at date t = 258 = 05/05/2006 when the ARCH coefficient rises from
0.4 to 1, and the GARCH coefficient decreases from around 0.6 to 0.4. Both of these changes suggest
that the impacts of shocks on conditional volatility were especially important during this time period.
It coincides with the strong adjustment of market operators’ expectations following the publication of
the first report of verified emissions by the European Commission (Alberola et al., 2008).
The second change in the estimated coefficient occurs at time t=451=05/02/2007. The ARCH coeffi-
cient suddenly drops after this date, while the GARCH coefficient increases. This result may also be
interpreted in light of the 2007 compliance event, which relates to the verification of 2006 emissions.
Market operators have anticipated the release of the report of the European Commission, and there-
fore the adjustment in market expectations occurs earlier than in 2006. Due to the “youth” of this
commodity market and rules in the making concerning the second trading period (2008-2012), the
first years of operation of the EU ETS were characterized by strong reversals in expectations around
yearly compliance events (Chevallier et al., 2009).32 Overall, these rolling windows estimates do not
support the view of a strong effect of option introduction on volatility dynamics. Nevertheless, the
continuing change in volatility may be partly due to option introduction, despite this hypothesis could
hardly be investigated further.
Once agents have integrated this information, we do not observe visually other changes in the estimates
of the ARCH coefficient, except for the GARCH coefficient which increases after t=636=11/10/2007.
5 Conclusion
This article investigates the effects of the introduction of the option market on the volatility of the
EU ETS. Following a brief review of key design issues on the EU ETS, we have presented the main
characteristics of both the futures and option markets on ECX. Then, we have detailed our econometric
methodology, which consists in capturing both unconditional and dynamic components of the volatility
of carbon futures returns with GARCH models, rolling estimates and endogenous structural break
detection following the introduction of ECX option prices on October 13, 2006. This methodology has
been robust to document changes in volatility on equity markets, but has not been applied yet on the
carbon market.
Based on daily data from April 2005 to April 2008, our results suggest that volatility has changed
during this period but we do find evidence that this change may be due to option introduction. As
in Antoniou and Foster (1992), we also find that GARCH estimates are statistically different before
and after the introduction of the derivatives market. We have run sensitivity tests with institutional
variables, energy and global commodity markets to capture the likely influence of other factors on the
32In particular, National Allocation Plans for Phase II were more strictly validated than during the first trading period.
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volatility of futures returns. These tests tend to confirm our preliminary results.
This static analysis is taken one step further with the investigation of the dynamic behavior of CO2
return volatilities. Rolling estimates with a window of 200 days reveal the presence of shocks related
to yearly compliance events in the EU ETS during April 2006 and February 2007. Furthermore, the
detection of endogenous structural breaks following Incla´n and Tiao (1994) yield to the identification
of a long-lasting effect that may be due to the introduction of the option market on the unconditional
volatility of CO2 returns, which reflects that this impact may not be captured adequately as a “one-off”
event. Collectively, these results are conform to the view that options do not systematically impact
the stability of the underlying market, but we do not find any evidence of an increase in efficiency due
to option introduction, while often argued in the literature.
An potential extension of this work using intraday data may be pursued relying on Liu and Maheu
(2009), who test for breaks in realized volatility with Bayesian estimation and an autoregressive
modeling of realized volatility (Corsi (2004), Andersen et al. (2007, 2009)). These methods have
not been used to detect structural breaks following the introduction of derivative products yet.
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